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Financial Development and
Growth in India.

Abstract:

In this paper I look to analyze whether bank loans have the ability to promote
productivity for firms and also whether banks are more effective relative to other
sources of lending such as the government. Using a panel dataset of 26000 firms
over the time period 1997-2014 I carry out multiple two-time period lagged OLS
regressions with proxy variables for firm productivity as well as some control
variables to observe the differences for bank against non-bank loans. The results
yielded illustrate that non-bank loans did not have a positive relationship and that
perhaps there is some form of zombie lending occurring. On the other hand bank
loans were shown to have positive impacts in the second lag. This could mean a
delayed positive impact from investing as it may take time for the benefits to be
received.

Introduction:

What is the relationship between strong financial systems and economic growth?
This is an important question that has been asked over the years and for an
emerging country like India it can be very interesting to observe. India is a BRIC
country, one with a lot of potential and as it continues to grow its financial systems
also become more detailed and intricate. Previous studies carried out on this topic
find there to be a positive relationship between economic growth and financial
development and I feel it is important to study this as the results can help to shape
future government policy that aims to promote greater financial development thus
foster more economic growth. My paper will look into how the banking system and
the supply of loans can affect firm productivity and thus affect the growth in the
economy. I will also be comparing bank versus non-bank loans to see which is the
most effective for firm productivity. In the past similar studies have been carried out
for other countries but no one has looked into emerging economies such as India
and so this paper will hopefully add to existing literature.

Literature Review:

There is a large volume of literature on this subject area, beginning with
Schumpeter (1911) where he emphasized the positive influence of the development
of a country’s financial sector on the rate of growth and the level of its per capita
income. Essentially the argument is that the services provided by the financial
sector, such as reallocating capital to the highest value use without substantial risk
of loss through moral hazard or adverse selection or transaction costs, are an
important catalyst of economic growth. Empirical studies carried out by Goldsmith
(1969) implemented data from 35 countries over the time period 1860-1963 seem
to be consistent with Schumpeter’s argument. Goldsmith concluded, “a rough
parallelism can be observed between economic and financial development if periods
of several decades are observed.” However as Goldsmith also noted studies such as
these can only suggest correlation and there is no possibility of establishing with
confidence any direction of causality or causal mechanism.

Following on from this there is an important addition to the literature by King and
Levine (1993). The authors look into the issue of causality in this research topic by
implementing a post hoc, ergo propter hoc approach. This approach highlights that
if an event (Y) follows after an event (X) occurs then X caused Y. In this instance it is
claimed that financial development was followed on by economic development,
hence financial development caused economic development. There are two major

issues with this methodology. Firstly a common omitted variable could drive both
financial development and growth such as propensity of households in the economy
to save for example. Since endogenous savings can affect the long run growth rate of
an economy, it may not be surprising that initial financial development and growth
are correlated. It is harder to refute with just cross-country regressions. Without the
presence of a well-accepted theory of growth, the list of potential omitted variables
that financial sector development could be a proxy for is very large. The second
issue is concerned with the fact that financial development, typically measured by
the level of credit or the size of the stock market, may predict economic growth
simply because financial markets anticipate future growth. The stock market
capitalizes the present value of growth opportunities; while financial institutions
lend more of they think the sector will grow. Thus financial development may be a
leading indicator instead of a causal factor.

One method in which to make progress on causality is to focus on the details of the
theoretical mechanisms through which financial development affects economic
growth and document their working. The paper produced by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) aims to do exactly this by constructing a test. They do this by identifying an
industry’s need for external finance from data on US firms. Under the assumption
that capital markets in the United States, especially for the large listed firms we
analyze, are relatively frictionless, this method allows us to identify an industry's
technological demand for external financing. Under the further assumption that
such a technological demand carries over to other countries, we examine whether

industries that are more dependent on external financing grow relatively faster in
countries that, a priori, are more financially developed. In the end the authors
discover that industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external finance
develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial
markets.

A more recent paper by Fisman and Love (2007) looks back over the work done by
RZ with the authors reexamining and reevaluating some of the assumptions made as
well as the robustness of the results. They illustrate that RZ might be implicitly
testing whether financial intermediaries allow firms to better respond to global
shocks to growth opportunities, rather than the extent that financial intermediaries
allow firms to grow in industries with an inherent financial dependence. Fisman and
Love propose a more direct measure by including US industry growth into the
original specification used by RZ. This is because if US capital markets are perfect
then actual growth in US is a good proxy for global growth opportunities. The
results yielded illustrated that their direct growth measure outperformed the
financial dependence measure from RZ. It is also less vulnerable to controlling for
outliers as well as the level of development.

My research paper will be able to add to the significant amount of literature in this
topic area as it will use these ideas and implement them on industry level panel data
for firms based in India. I will test the work carried out by RZ and relate it to those
firms in India to see if this theory holds true.

Methodology:

In order to carry out my analysis I will be implementing OLS regression using the
Prowess dataset provided. The dataset consists of just over 26,000 firms over the
time period 1997 till 2014. This enables me to have an ample amount of
observations to carry out my analysis. Unfortunately there is no variable in the
dataset that directly measures firm productivity, thus I decided to use both firm
sales as well as firm income as proxy variables to represent productivity. I would
like to control for firm size, as there are many different firms in my sample. I
decided to use net fixed assets as my control. I also include the GDP of India as
macroeconomic control. I will run three different regression specifications for sales
as well as income. I begin by first using total liabilities, which consists of all the loans
the firms have taken out. This is used alongside GDP of India and net fixed assets to
ascertain the relationship between liabilities and my proxies for firm productivity.
The next specification I use will be separating the loans into bank versus non-bank
loans. The bank loans variable consists of loans from banks as well as other financial
institutions while the non-bank variable consists of loans provided by the central
and state government. The second set of regressions will be using bank loans as my
main independent variable to observe the relationship between bank loans and my
proxy dependent variables for firm productivity. The third set of regressions I carry
out is to use non-bank as my main explanatory variable in order to observe the
relationship between non-bank loans and my proxy variables for firm productivity.
The second set of regressions is used to be able to answer my first research question

about the relationship between bank loans and firm productivity. The third sets of
regressions are necessary to answer the second research question where we look at
whether bank loans are the most effective for firm productivity. Sales, income, net
fixed assets are all divided by total assets of firms and also by the GDP deflator of
India for robustness. Due to the large numbers associated with these variables, most
of them being in millions or billions of rupees, I will log these variables. All of the
right hand side variables will be lagged. The main independent variables will be
lagged two time periods to observe and delayed effects. For example for the first set
of regressions total liabilities will be lagged at time period t-1 as well as t-2. This will
be the case for both bank loans and non-bank loans. The equations below illustrate
the regression models I will be implementing in my analysis:

•

1)ln (Sales/total assets) = β +β1Totalliabt-1 + β2 lnTotalliabt-2 + β3
lnindiaGDP-1 + β4lnnetfixedassets-1 + Uit

•

2) ln(Sales/total assets) = β + β1Bankborrowt-1 + β2Bankborrowt-2 + β3
lnindiaGDPt-1 + β4lnnetfixedassets-1 + Uit

•

3) ln(Sales/total assets) = β nonBankborrowt-1 + β2nonBankborrowt-2 +
β3indiaGDPt-1 β4lnNetfixedassetst-1 + Uit

This specification is carried out for (sales/GDP deflator), (income/total assets) as
well as (income/GDP deflator) as the dependent variable.

Results

To begin with I start my analysis using the firms’ total liabilities and regress sales,
which is divided by total assets, with two lags of total liabilities plus net fixed assets
as well as GDP of India. This is followed on by the regression with two lags of bank
loans and finally the last regression containing two lags of non-bank loans. The table
below illustrates the results yielded from this analysis for sales that is divided by
total assets:

VARIABLES

L.lnTotalliab1
L2.lnTotalliab1
lnNetfixedassets1
lnindiaGDP
L.lnbank

(1)
totallaib with netfixedassets

-1.224***
(0.248)
-0.641***
(0.203)
0.173***
(0.0148)
-0.139***
(0.0353)

L2.lnbank
L.lnnonbank

(2)
bank with
netfixedassets

(3)
nonbank
with
netfixed
assets

0.102
(0.0630)
-0.00233
(0.0454)
-0.119***
(0.0178)
-0.00573
(0.0214)

0.324***
(0.109)
-0.0557
(0.0735)

L2.lnnonbank
Constant

1.967***
(0.646)

0.178
(0.734)

0.0499**
*
(0.0147)
-0.0414*
(0.0225)
0.965
(1.257)

Observations
R-squared
Number of
CompanyName1

123,722
0.021
16,928

16,360
0.018
4,126

From the table above we can observe that for the total liabilities regression, the two
lags for total liabilities prove to be significant and have a negative impact on sales.
This suggests that an increase in total liabilities would lead to a decrease in firm
sales. Net fixed assets have a positive significant relationship to sales, which
theoretically makes sense. The second regression shows that bank loans have a
negative relationship with sales. The first lag does show significance while the
second lag does not. Net fixed assets are no longer significant either but still show a
positive relationship to sales. A negative relationship for bank loans does not
correspond with the existing literature. This could hint at the existence of zombie
lending practices. This is when loans are given to firms even though they are not
profitable. Further analysis will have to be carried out to confirm whether this could
be the case. The non-bank variable also shows a significant negative relationship.
This could be expected as the government is not profit driven and would give out
loans to companies regardless of their profitability, hence perhaps more evidence of
zombie lending occurring. There is one major issue with the third regression
relative to the first two and that is the number if observations decrease
dramatically. This hinders the reliability of the results, especially when comparing
to the other regressions which have far more observations.

6,157
0.066
1,664

The next regression I carry out looks into effect on income. The table below
illustrates the regressions using income that is divided by total assets:

VARIABLES

L.lnTotalliab1
L2.lnTotalliab1
lnNetfixedassets1
lnindiaGDP

(1)
totallaib with netfixedassets

0.223
(2.369)
-0.815***
(0.164)
0.143***
(0.00994)
-0.156***
(0.0334)

L.lnbank

(2)
bank with
netfixedassets

(3)
nonbank
with
netfixedass
ets

0.0883*
(0.0521)
0.0117
(0.0373)

0.133***
(0.0448)
-0.0382
(0.0620)

-0.0932***
(0.0156)
0.0198
(0.0163)

L2.lnbank
L.lnnonbank

Constant

2.199***
(0.613)

-0.386
(0.590)

-0.0307**
(0.0120)
-0.00485
(0.0178)
0.319
(1.094)

Observations
R-squared
Number of
CompanyName1

146,383
0.020
19,540

17,811
0.010
4,386

6,490
0.017
1,718

L2.lnnonbank

From the table above we can observe that the first lag of total liabilities is showing a
positive relationship however it is not significant. The second lag illustrates a
negative relationship and shows to be significant. For bank loans the first lag also

illustrates a significant negative relationship once again leading us to suggest the
existence of zombie lending. Interestingly in the second lag it can be seen that there
is now a positive relationship between bank loans and my proxy for firm
productivity. It is worth noting that this is not shown to be significant but can still
point out to a delayed positive effect of the loan on my proxies for firm productivity.
Non-bank loans still continue to have a negative relationship with my proxies for
firm productivity, with only the first lag being significant. Net fixed assets can be
seen to have a positive significant relationship with income as I expected. The issue
with the observations for the third regression continues as they drop drastically
relative to the other two regressions thus making reliable comparisons is quite
difficult.

So we have observed that when using sales divided by total assets we find that there
is a consistent and significant negative relationship with total liabilities, bank loans
and non-bank loans. With the bank loans we could suggest that there is the
existence of zombie lending in the economy. For the non-banks especially, the
existence of zombie lending could be a realistic situation due to the fact that the
government is not looking to profit maximize and so would carry on giving loans to
those companies that are not profitable as well. The next step of the analysis will
now be to regress my proxy variables that are divided by the GDP deflator for India.
The table below illustrates the results for sales divided by the GDP deflator:

VARIABLES
L.lnTotalliab2
L2.lnTotalliab2
lnNetfixedassets2
lnindiaGDP
L.lnbank

(1)
totallaib with
netfixedassets
0.499***
(0.0175)
-0.0430***
(0.00872)
0.318***
(0.0137)
-0.109***
(0.0377)

L2.lnbank
L.lnnonbank

(2)
bank with
netfixedassets

(3)
nonbank with
netfixedassets

0.606***
(0.0501)
0.0754*
(0.0445)
-0.00629
(0.0250)
0.0315
(0.0244)

0.549***
(0.0813)
0.0318
(0.0755)

Constant

2.095***
(0.689)

-0.398
(0.730)

-0.0443***
(0.0141)
-0.0368
(0.0236)
1.184
(1.331)

Observations
R-squared
Number of
CompanyName1

123,721
0.237
16,928

16,360
0.158
4,126

6,157
0.164
1,664

L2.lnnonbank

The results above illustrate that both lags for total liabilities are significant however
what is interesting is that it is showing a positive relationship with my proxy
variable in the first lag. The second lag however now illustrates a negative
relationship and so this regression shows that over time the total liabilities is having
a negative effect on my proxy for firm productivity. This could again be due to the
existence of zombie lending practices. The bank loan variable does not show any
significance in either time period. It is negative for the first lag but surprisingly it is
shown to be positive in the second lag. This could be highlighting a delayed positive

effect from the bank loan as it takes time to invest the loan and see the effects. For
example a company could receive a loan and purchase new machinery. The positive
effects of increased productivity would not be immediately felt and perhaps over a
couple years we would see the benefits. The non-bank variable remains negative
throughout the two time periods and is only significant for the first time period.
Again this is expected due to the nature of the government in that it is not looking to
be efficient and will supply loans to all companies. I still have the issue of my
observations decreasing significantly for the last regression, which hinders the
reliability. Net fixed assets is seen to be positive and significant for all my
regressions, which is to be expected.

The final set of regressions I carry out will be to regress income, which is divided by
the GDP deflator, and observe the relationship for all three different independent
variables. The table below illustrates the results:

VARIABL
ES

L.lnTotalli
ab2
L2.lnTotal
liab2
lnNetfixed
assets2

(1)
totallaib with netfixedassets

(2)
bank with
netfixedassets

(3)
nonbank
with
netfixeda
ssets

(0.00757)
0.263***

0.425***

0.386***

(0.00983)

(0.0403)

(0.0533)

0.551***
(0.0141)
-0.0174**

lnindiaGD
P

-0.150***

0.0658*

0.0613

(0.0370)

(0.0375)

(0.0703)

L.lnbank

0.0627***
(0.0197)
0.0877***
(0.0189)

L2.lnbank
L.lnnonba
nk
L2.lnnonb
ank

0.0299**
(0.0117)
-0.00978

Constant

2.658***
(0.677)

-0.542
(0.606)

(0.0186)
0.974
(1.247)

Observati
ons
R-squared
Number
of
Company
Name1

146,381

17,811

6,490

0.262
19,540

0.118
4,386

0.103
1,718

The total liabilities variable is significant for both time lags although it is seen to
have a positive relationship with my proxy variable. It follows the same pattern as
the sales table in that the second lag shows a negative relationship. So over time the
relationship changes and is significant showing that there could be some kind of
poor lending practices occurring. The bank loans variable is showing significance in
both time periods and interestingly is positive for both. So bank loans have a
positive effect on my proxy variable for firm productivity. This lines up with exactly
what is expected from the current literature on this topic. In essence it shows that
firms take out loans, invest and then this leads to gains in productivity which in this

case is gains in income. The non-bank variables are once again negative in both time
periods but are only significant for the first time period. This again shows that the
government is unconcerned with whether the firms might be inefficient but will
look to give out loans anyway. However with the number of observations still being
an issue the reliability of the third regression is hindered. Net fixed assets is still
shown to be positive and significant for all three regressions.

Policy Implications:

Now that we have carried out our analysis we know that non-bank loans, which are
those that are given out by central and state government, are not effective for my
proxy variables for firm productivity. Although the reliability of some of the
regressions can be questioned, due to the lack of observations, it can still be argued
that the results illustrate signs of zombie lending. There is a consistent negative
relationship throughout the regressions I have carried out. Perhaps these are big
national companies and they lobby more with the government in order to get these
loans even though they are not being as efficient as other companies. Bank loans on
the other hand have shown some positive effects for the proxy variables I use.
Unlike the government banks need to be efficient and must choose carefully
whether or not to give out loans. Moving forward I would recommend that the
government play a much less significant role for lending and it is left more to the
banks as it would be much healthier for the economy.

Conclusion:

To conclude, I find that the supply of bank loans has a positive relationship with my
proxy variables for firm productivity. Using a dataset covering 26000 firms between
1997-2014 I am able to illustrate that banks lending to firms can lead to
improvements in both sales as well as income. Over the time periods I lagged we can
observe a delayed positive impact. The non-bank loans, which consisted of loans
from the central and state government, are shown to have negative effects on my
proxy variables. This could be illustrating that there are zombie lending practices
occurring and that some of these large national companies are able to lobby with the
government to receive these loans even thought they are not functioning efficiently.
On balance the number of observations is not significant for the non-bank
regressions, which hinders the reliability of those results. In terms of policy I would
recommend that most of the lending should be done through the banks as they
would be more careful as to who they loan to and too much zombie lending in an
economy can have disastrous effects.
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